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Israelis failed in their attempt to damage Egyptian-American relations.6 They 
too assumed then that incidents of this kind affect real or perceived national 
interests. The people in the community responsible for the affair had to pay 
the price. Ostrovsky, on the other hand, became a rich man. 
By Way of Deception is an interesting book written well by a clever 
man. It should not, however, be treated as an accurate case-study of the Israeli 
Mossad. 
Gideon Doron 
Tel Aviv University 
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Intelligence defectors are now publishing their autobiographies with 
almost the same regularity as sportsmen and politicians, and the contents have 
a similar predictability. Yet they remain compulsive reading. The spy and the 
defector are archetypal twentieth-century figures; the Cold War was but-
tressed on both sides by images, real and imagined, of espionage and the 
enemy within. What was it that made people work for the other side? What 
explains the fascination of clandestinity and the revulsion felt for traitors? 
What was the real importance of human sources, among all the technical 
wizardry? No one really knows the answers; and we search this literature for 
clues. 
These two books are good examples of the genre. Blake's career as a 
member of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), KGB agent, and es-
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caper from Wormwood Scrubs is well-known. His account has a shaky start 
in his description of SIS's offices in Carlton Gardens ("This fine old stuccoed 
town house its heavy double green doors with brass knocker, its chandeliered 
marble entrance hall and monumental staircase with wrought-iron guilded 
banisters was to play an important part in my life.") which reminds one of 
Peter Wright's ghostwriter. But thereafter it is cool and restrained and com-
mands respect. The outsider cannot tell how much is suppressed or distorted, 
but it has the ring of truth. 
The effect, and no doubt the purpose, is to present Blake's extraordi-
nary career as a conventional, low-key life story. There is a lot about his 
childhood in Holland, his education in Egypt, and his wartime escape to 
England through Spain. There is ample domestic detail about his mother, his 
two marriages and his children, and at the end of the book there are reflections 
on communism and rather banal accounts of his current life-style. He is 
charitable towards everyone; there are none of the waspish personal judg-
ments that enlivened Philby's life story. There may even be a faint, deadpan 
sense of humor, as when he describes Wormwood Scrubs as a convenient air 
lock for the transition to life in the Soviet Union. It is almost as if Blake set 
out to write a parody of the old-style diplomatic memoir. 
Thus it provides relatively little insight on intelligence. There is a 
little, but not much, about the SIS operations in which Blake was engaged, 
though he conveys something of the frenetic atmosphere of intelligence col-
lection in Berlin in the mid-fifties. He says hardly anything about the KGB 
but makes it appear, hardly surprisingly, to have been efficient at its job. He 
confirms that he betrayed the "Berlin Tunnel" line-tap and other technical 
operations to the Russians, but otherwise is reticent about the information he 
passed over. 
The interest is in Blake the man. Why did he do it? And having done 
it, why did he confess when interrogated by his SIS colleagues, condemning 
himself to his forty-two years' sentence? Typically he defuses the mystery. 
His was a simple ideological conversion to communism while one of the 
Western diplomatic internees in North Korea. It was sparked off by dislike of 
the South Korean regime, copies of Marx and Lenin supplied by the Soviet 
Embassy in Pyongyang, and discussions of these texts with the eccentric left-
wing ambassador with whom he was incarcerated. If the story is true, the 
Russians' supply of these books must rank as one of the triumphs of cultural 
diplomacy. The whole issue is disposed of in six or seven pages. He admits 
to subsequent qualms of conscience over his marriage and family, but none 
about working for the KGB. His confession was an outburst of pride, pro-
voked by the suggestion that the Russians had tortured and blackmailed him 
while a prisoner. His escape was at his own instigation, as has been confirmed 
by the other participants. He recognizes the failure of Soviet communism, but 
believes that some other ideal society will eventually emerge. He has no 
regrets. 
One doubts whether this can be the complete story. Yet it carries more 
credibility than the earlier claims by Western writers that Blake was a triple 
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agent in a British operation that went wrong, and was sprung from prison by 
the KGB. Phillip Knightley, who put out these interpretations some years ago, 
contributes a foreword in which he concludes that Blake's account here is 
frank and fair. Simple explanations are often correct. But if what is given here 
is a true bill then it gives us little help in spotting potential defectors. Blake 
had a foreign background and emerges with a rather Calvinist, whole-hogging 
temperament. But it is difficult to say that these are better indicators of 
potential treachery than his rule of never drinking more than half a bottle of 
wine a day. 
Kuzichkin's career is less well-known, and his book is at the same time 
more informative and less thought-provoking. He was a bright lad recruited 
by the KGB as a graduate student and deployed in Tehran as an agent-runner 
and recruiter. He claims to have had no love for the Soviet system, but this did 
not prevent him from being an energetic and ambitious case officer. Accord-
ing to his own account his defection was sparked off simply by losing a cache 
of secret documents, hidden on the instructions of his local superior and 
removed by a jealous colleague. His planned escape from Iran over the 
Turkish border thus seems a simple act of self-preservation. 
The interest of the book thus lies not in the author's motivation but in 
his account of the KGB and its tradecraft. There is little personal detail, but 
ample — almost excessive — accounts of KGB training, agent-running in 
Tehran through the period of the Shah's fall, and the atmosphere and person-
alities of the KGB and the Tehran Embassy. Kuzichkin's general thesis is of 
the KGB's bureaucratic impotence, in an atmosphere in which survival was 
more important than achievement. Results were fabricated; the general at-
mosphere was of court politics. No doubt this was true to some extent, though 
one always has to allow for a defector's prejudices. 
The book casts a useful light on the modalities of Soviet espionage. It 
illustrates just how much time intelligence officers spend driving around, 
getting to know the cities in which they operate and establishing means of 
shaking off surveillance; they have a good potential second career as taxi 
drivers. Kuzichkin also brings out the large part played in Tehran by radio 
support. Short-range radio was used for signals from agents; the KGB's local 
monitoring of SAVAK's surveillance net was an integral part of their 
countersurveillance techniques and their operational planning; interception 
from the Embassy of police networks was a primary source of tactical intelli-
gence during the tumultuous period of Khomeini's accession to power. Espio-
nage and counterespionage had their own radio war; though it should not be 
assumed that the features described here would apply elsewhere. 
Both these personal accounts leave the big questions unanswered. 
There have always been spies, but institutionalized espionage, counterespio-
nage and defection are twentieth-century innovations. Their growth was 
linked predominantly with communism and the Cold War, though one should 
not overlook their importance in the Arab-Israeli conflict and all its ramifica-
tions. One of the oddities of the Gorbachev era has been that at least up to 
August 1991 the KGB's espionage activities apparently continued under their 
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own momentum; has this aspect of the Cold War now ended? We have an 
increasingly open world, and increasingly powerful technical intelligence 
sources. Is it time to re-assess the role of human ones? 
The obstacles to change should not be underrated. Even discounting 
the vested interests of espionage agencies, spies can still do some things that 
the modern technical sources cannot, for example the penetration of terrorist 
and other clandestine organizations. Moreover, espionage supports the tech-
nical sources, for example in the link between espionage and code-breaking, 
or in the world of bugging and eavesdropping and other close-access technical 
operations. The idea that intelligence can be divided into "dirty" espionage 
and "clean" technical collection is an over-simplification. 
Yet both these books bring out in their different ways the threatening 
nature of espionage, and its peculiar effects on international relationships. It 
is linked with and reinforces special fears, fortress mentalities, and conspira-
torial world-views. One of the less publicized Western intelligence successes 
in the Cold War was in containing Soviet espionage and successfully counter-
attacking the KGB and GRU; but this very success tended to perpetuate the 
embattled and distorted inputs that these organizations made to Soviet 
policymaking. Some espionage will still be needed to meet security require-
ments in a new world order, but it must be kept in its place. One of the 
challenges that has not yet been addressed in the future of international 
security is somehow to promote a concept of "reasonable sufficiency" in 
espionage, replacing the Cold War armaments race in penetration and counter-
penetration that is portrayed in these two accounts. 
Michael Herman 
Nuffield College, Oxford 
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